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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                     
No. 09-2019
                     
VICKI CRAWFORD; KEITH CRAWFORD, JR.; 
KEITH CRAWFORD, III, a minor, by and 
through his next of kin, Vicki Crawford 
v.
WASHINGTON COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES ("CYS"); 
CYS CASEWORKER CHRISTIE CROSS; 
CYS CASEWORKER CHRISTINE PAPOVICH; 
CYS CASE WORKER NANCY GRAY; 
CYS SUPERVISOR LAURA BORASH; 
CYS DIRECTOR JEFFREY FELDON
Vicki Crawford; Keith Crawford, Jr.; Keith Crawford, III,
Appellants
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-06-cv-01698)
District Judge: Hon. David Stewart Cercone
                    
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 6, 2009
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 24, 2009)
2                          
OPINION
                          
COWEN, Circuit Judge
Keith Crawford, Jr. and Vicki Crawford appeal the order of the District Court
granting summary judgment in favor of Washington County Children and Youth Services
(“CYS”), CYS caseworkers, and CYS officers (collectively, “Appellees”).  We will
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellants are the parents of a minor child, K.C.  In October 2000, CYS received a
call from the North Franklin Police Department indicating that K.C., who was wandering
alone near a McDonald’s Restaurant, might be the victim of child abuse.  The police
observed that, despite the cold weather, K.C. was barefoot and dressed in shorts and a t-
shirt.  The police took K.C. into their custody and CYS initiated an investigation into his
circumstances.  CYS learned that K.C. had no formal education, had no immunizations,
and was living in unsanitary conditions.  CYS removed K.C. from his home.     
In August 2002, K.C. informed his foster parents that he suffered sexual abuse at
the hands of his parents.  In particular, he stated that his parents had licked and touched
his genitalia regularly.  Additionally, he alleged that his father made him watch his
mother and aunt engaged in sexual acts through a hole in the wall several times.  CYS
interviewed his foster parents and observed his behavior in their home, which was
3consistent with allegations of abuse.  CYS had K.C. meet with several psychiatrists and
counselors to determine whether he exhibited the signs of sexual abuse.  Each specialist
concluded that his allegations were credible.  Upon completion of their investigation,
CYS filed a Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights.  The court granted
CYS’s petition on January 14, 2004 and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.  
In 2004 the Department of Public Welfare issued an order adding Appellants
names to ChildLine Registry, a registry of sex offenders.  On November 18, 2004, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed that order.
On November 15, 2007, a hearing was conducted in the Court of Common Pleas in
response to a complaint filed by CYS.  Vicki Crawford learned that K.C. was residing at a
local shelter and contacted the shelter, pretending to be K.C.’s grandmother.  K.C.
testified that his grandmother was deceased, but that he answered the phone call
nonetheless.  When K.C. answered, he realized that it was his mother and terminated the
call.  The court denied CYS’s request for a protective order, but admonished Appellants
to refrain from contacting K.C.     
On December 22, 2006, Appellants filed the instant action against Appellees,
alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(D), (E), and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, resulting from Appellees’ investigation and
the resulting termination of Appellants’ parental rights.  Appellees moved to dismiss,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The
4district court granted Appellees’ motion with respect to each of Appellants’ claims,
except for their claim arising under Section 1983.  With respect to that claim, the district
court permitted the parties to proceed to discovery to develop the merits and to determine
whether any facts supported equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 
At the conclusion of discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment asserting
that Appellants failed to establish a claim under Section 1983 and that any such claim
would be time-barred under the statute of limitations.  The district court granted
Appellees’ motion on both grounds.  Appellants’ appeal from this order is now before this
court.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “The standard of review applicable to the
District Court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary.”  Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp.,
412 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 2005).  We must apply the same test employed by the District
Court under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness
The statute of limitations for claims arising under Section 1983 is two years.  See
Cowell v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Sameric Corp. of
Delaware v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)).  Any claims filed outside
this period are untimely.  “A section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew
5or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.”  Sameric Corp., 142
F.3d at 599.  There is, however, an equitable exception to the timeliness requirement. 
“[W]hen a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long
as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in
such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would
otherwise be time barred.”  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292 (quoting Brenner v. Local 514,
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991)).  This
exception is known as the “continuing violations doctrine.”  Id.  
The district court properly concluded that Appellants’ claim was barred by the
statute of limitations.  CYS removed K.C. from Appellants’ home in October of 2000.  At
that time, Appellants denied the charges of neglect alleged by CYS.  In August 2002,
CYS initiated its sex-abuse investigation, ultimately determining that the evidence
supported K.C.’s allegations.  CYS then sought to permanently terminate Appellants’
parental rights, a result accomplished by January 2004.  Throughout the sex-abuse
investigation, Appellants maintained their innocence.  From the removal to the
termination of their parental rights, Appellants had the facts necessary to assert their
Section 1983 claim and failed to do so until December 22, 2006.  Their claim is untimely. 
The district court properly rejected Appellants’ request for equitable tolling under
the continuing violations doctrine.  Appellants contend that CYS’s application in 2007 for
a protective order following their telephone call to K.C.’s shelter indicates that CYS
6continued to engage in a practice of unlawful harassment and that prior conduct,
including CYS’s investigation and termination of parental rights, should be deemed to fall
within this continuing practice as timely.  There is no support for this argument. 
Appellants’ claims arise out of CYS’s investigation and termination of Appellants’
parental rights.  CYS completed its investigation in 2002, and a court terminated
Appellants’ parental rights in January 2004.  The 2007 complaint had nothing to do with
the investigation and whether Appellants should retain their parental rights.  The 2007
complaint is an effect of the earlier obtained order terminating parental rights; however,
“a continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects
from an original violation.”  Cowell, 263 F.3d at 293 (quoting Ocean Acres Ltd. v. Dare
County Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983)).  
Moreover, not only is CYS’s 2007 complaint unrelated to its earlier, allegedly
unlawful conduct, the 2007 complaint is the direct result of Appellants’ actions.  Had
K.C.’s mother not contacted K.C.’s shelter, pretending to be his grandmother, CYS would
not have initiated the 2007 complaint.  Appellants’ claims do not fall under this equitable
exception.  
B. Merits
Under Section 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
7an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”  42 U.S.C. §
1983.  To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a violation
of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”  Kneipp
v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).  
This circuit has recognized “constitutionally protected liberty interests that parents
have in the custody, care and management of their children.”  Croft v. Westmoreland
County CYS, 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
258 (1983)).  However, this liberty interest is not absolute.  “The right to familial
integrity, in other words, does not include a right to remain free from child abuse
investigations.”  Id.  Thus, courts “must balance the fundamental liberty interests of the
family unit with the compelling interests of the state in protecting children from abuse.” 
Id.  A social worker’s decision or conduct constitutes a substantive due process violation
only when it is “so clearly arbitrary” that it “can properly be said to shock the
conscience.”  Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for Appellees on
Appellants’ substantive due process claim.  The gist of the claim is that Appellees failed
to properly evaluate K.C.’s recantation of sexual abuse.  As the district court explained,
Appellants presented no evidence in support of this assertion.  On the other hand,
Appellees presented evaluations of K.C. from several specialists, all of whom concluded
that his original allegations were credible, in support of their application for termination
8of parental rights and in listing Appellants on the ChildLine Registry.  Further, Appellants
presented no evidence demonstrating that CYS social workers perjured themselves during
their investigation of K.C.’s case, other than their bald assertions.  Appellants also claim
that the state improperly concluded that K.C.’s family home was sufficiently deficient to
merit termination of their parental rights.  Evidence in the record establishes that
Appellants failed to provide schooling, basic medical care, such as vaccines, sanitary
housing, and appropriate supervision.  Bald assertions to the contrary are insufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Finally, the district court properly concluded that, to the extent that Appellants
appear to raise claims on behalf of K.C., they lack standing to assert such claims as their
parental rights were severed.    
IV. CONCLUSION
We will affirm the grant of summary judgment.
